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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper examines Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) listed companies’ 
human rights disclosures.  
Design/methodology/approach – Year-ending 2012 annual report disclosures of 75 IDX 
listed companies are analyzed. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines are employed 
as the disclosure index checklist. 
Findings - The results show a low level of voluntary human rights disclosure (36.74%). 
The highest level of communication is for Assessment issues. Very few companies 
disclosed information about Child labour and forced and compulsory labour. Statistical 
analysis reveals that board size significantly influences ‘human rights’ communication in 
a positive direction. Company size, one of the control variables in this study, is also 
found to be positively significant. Managerial stakeholder theory partially explains the 
variability of these disclosures. 
Research limitations/implications - The main implication of the findings is that key 
stakeholders do not see the importance of human rights issues to be disclosed, except for 
commissioners. It seems that commissioners have the spirit of the United Nation Guiding 
Principles (UNGPs), requiring companies to respect human rights in daily business 
operations. Another implication is that companies may attempt to hide certain 
information regarding child labour and forced and compulsory labour.  
Originality/value - This paper provides insights into the disclosure practices of human 
rights issues in Indonesia. The paper also investigates the key determinants of human 
rights disclosures, an empirical test which is largely ignored in previous human rights 
reporting studies. This paper highlights the potency of commissioners in campaigning 
and promoting the importance of social responsibility on human rights for corporate 
sustainability.  
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that Indonesia is the biggest country in South-East Asia which has 
been actively participating and contributing its considerable role to regional and global 
forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Group of 20 (G20)(Pakpahan, 2011). 
According to Pakpahan (2012), Indonesia has coordinated EAS by also including Russia 
and the USA in this forum’s architecture. There is also a big opportunity for Indonesia to 
communicate and discuss about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s 
issues with the other G20 members given that Indonesia is the only ASEAN country in 
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G20 (see Poole, 2014). Such an opportunity implies Indonesia’s important, strategic, and 
bargaining position as the representative of ASEAN countries within G20. 
 
Indonesia, which is ranked as the fifth most populous nation in the world and is the 
world’s biggest Muslim-majority country, has a significant improvement in the economy 
in the last couple of years, enjoying annual economic growth rates around 6%. (Allen, 
2013). According to the World Bank’s recent report, such an improvement places this 
country into the 10th largest economy in the world in 2014 (The Jakarta Post, 2014). 
Some commentators even argue that Indonesia will be the next giant in Asia in the near 
future (see Allen, 2013). To make this argument become a reality, the new Indonesian 
president, Joko Widodo, explicitly invited foreign investors in his presentation at the 
2014 APEC1 CEO Summit to invest in infrastructure projects in Indonesia (Ministry of 
Finance Republic of Indonesia, 2014).  
 
In spite of Indonesia’s ‘spectacular’ economic growth growing economy and its vital role 
in the regional and international forums, it appears that there are still complex social 
problems faced by this developing nation. These problems include human rights issues 
which may become a barrier for Indonesia to achieve its better ‘future’.  This country, for 
instance, still has problems with child labours. According to Director of the Indonesian 
Directorate General of Training and Productivity2, in 2013, there were approximately 
300,000 child labours in Indonesia3 (Herawati, 2013). There are also discriminations for 
female workers such as wage discriminations against male workers, sexual abuses, and 
employee benefit discriminations (Himawan, 2013). Conflicts between companies and 
local communities also occur in some parts of this developing nation because companies 
ignore the rights of the indigenous people. In the Province of Central Sulawesi, for 
instance, there was a conflict between PT Cahaya Manunggal Abadi, a mining company, 
with the local community because this company planned to do a gold mining exploration 
on the land owned by the local community (Nugraha, 2013). This company even did not 
offer share ownerships to the local community, causing the anger of this community.  
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In today’s business environment, it is arguably important that companies should ensure 
that the rights of employees and the indigenous people are well fulfilled. Such a 
fulfillment is parts of companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) and is critical to 
be undertaken for the sustainability companies’ operations (see Gallhofer, et al., 2011). 
According to Epstein and Buhovac (2014), global stakeholders currently expect 
companies to behave in a ‘good social manner’, including undertaking good human 
rights-related CSR practices, and to communicate this ‘social manner’ in certain media 
such as annual reports. Creditors, for example, will provide funds for companies if these 
companies undertake good CSR practices such as applying non-discrimination policies to 
all of their employees. Human rights violation occurring in Indonesia therefore threatens 
the sustainability of companies and the future of Indonesia’s economy.    
 
In Indonesia, all listed companies are required to report any social responsibility activities 
in their annual reports (BAPEPAM-LK, 2006). Limited companies in and/or related to 
the area of natural resources, regardless of whether they are listed or not, are also required 
to undertake social and environmental responsibility activities and communicate these 
activities in their annual reports under Act No. 40/2007 and Government Regulation No. 
47/2012 (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2007; Cahaya et al., 2015). In those 
regulations, however, there are no specific requirements for companies to disclose human 
rights - related CSR activities. The Indonesian accounting standards4 themselves are 
completely silent on human rights issues. Disclosures of human rights issues in Indonesia 
therefore remain voluntary. 
 
There are many past studies examining CSR reporting worldwide, including human rights 
related CSR reporting  (see for example Islam and McPhail, 2011; Sikka, 2011; McPhail 
and Adams, 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). The number of studies looking at human 
rights disclosures itself is growing, signaling a growing interest in human rights related 
CSR reporting. Several refereed journals such as Critical Perspectives on Accounting and 
Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability Journal have even documented human rights 
related CSR reporting studies into special issue publications. These published human 
rights accounting studies, however, do not examine the possible determinants of human 
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rights disclosures. Islam and McPhail (2011), for instance, explore the extent to which 
multinational garment retailers invoke the language of human rights when 
communicating corporate responsibility information. McPhail and Adams (2016) 
undertake a critical discourse analysis to explore the scope of rights for which 
corporations are accountable and find that companies’ constructions of human rights are 
broad, ranging from labour rights to the right to health and a clean environment. Siddiqui 
and Uddin (2016) investigate the state-business nexus in response to human rights 
violations in the Bangladeshi ready-made garments industry by participating in multiple-
stakeholder meetings, interviewing participants, and analyzing documentary evidence in 
newspapers. As these past studies do not examine the possible determinants of human 
rights disclosures, factors influencing the variability of the extent of labour disclosures 
have not been documented in the literature. This study therefore attempts to fill this 
literature gap by examining the extent and the determinants of human rights disclosures 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) listed companies’ annual reports.  
  
This study contributes to the existing literature in a variety of ways. Firstly, this study 
quantitatively examines the possible determinants of a specific subset of CSR reporting 
namely human rights disclosure. As discussed above, studies on human rights disclosure 
have been undertaken by previous researchers but they do not investigate the possible 
predictors of such disclosures. Secondly, this study examines human rights disclosure in 
Indonesia, a country which, on one side, has an arguably promising economy but, on 
another side, has complex social problems, including human rights problems. It is 
therefore expected that this study can provide useful insights regarding disclosures of 
human rights by companies in this emerging country. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the study, 
including the purposes and the significance of the study. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework adopted in the study and develops the hypotheses. The research 
methodology is presented in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the statistical results, followed 
by Section 5 which discusses the conclusions of the results. 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
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Stakeholder theory explains social disclosure practices in terms of the relationship 
between firms and their stakeholders (Barton et al., 1989). Freeman (1984, 46) defines a 
stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the firm's objectives” (e.g. creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, public interest 
groups, and governmental bodies). The idea that corporations have stakeholders has 
become common place in the literature since 1984 (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). As 
argued by Roberts (1992) and (1985), a good relationship between firms and stakeholders 
are important for successfully achieving a firms long term objectives.  
 
This theory has two branches, namely an ethical (accountability) branch and a managerial 
(organization-centered) branch (Deegan, 2009; Gray et al., 1996). The ethical branch of 
stakeholder theory postulates that all stakeholder groups have a right to be provided with 
information about how a firm affects them, even if they choose not to use that 
information, and even if they in turn can not directly affect the firm (Deegan, 2009). This 
is because, within the stakeholder view, there are implicit contracts between society and 
corporations in relation to any social activities those corporations have done (Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2004; Brown and Deegan, 1998). Companies therefore have a responsibility 
to society to act in their bests interests and to provide them with social disclosures so that 
they can evaluate the performance of those companies with respect to the social contracts 
(Henderson et al., 2004). 
 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory postulates that firms identify important 
groups of stakeholders and seek to manage each group to benefit the firm (Henderson et 
al., 2004). Jones (1999) argues that each group of stakeholders has different interests and 
the firms should accommodate those interests. One means to manage groups of 
stakeholders and their interests is through voluntary disclosures (Henderson et al., 2004). 
A firm, for instance, can voluntarily disclose social information that informs particular 
groups of stakeholders (e.g. labour union) in the area of operation that is of concern to 
them (e.g. employees’ health and safety issues)(Henderson et al., 2004).  
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Stakeholder group identification, which is the main feature of managerial stakeholder 
theory (Cooper, 2004), is very important for determining a company’s future actions. The 
more important the stakeholder group to the company, the more effort will be exerted in 
managing the relationship with that group (Gray et al., 1996). In the context of this study, 
this means that more effort will be exerted by a company in undertaking human rights - 
social activities such as providing training concerning human rights issues to security 
personnel and disclosing those activities in the annual report. As argued by Roberts 
(1992), corporate social disclosure has been a relatively successful media for companies 
to manage their stakeholder relationships. 
 
This paper argues that companies in Indonesia disclose human rights information in order 
to satisfy important or influential stakeholders. This is because companies have limited 
resources to undertake human rights – related CSR activities as well as communicate 
those activities in their annual reports. To be efficient5, companies might think to only 
consider identifying and satisfying influential stakeholders (instead of all stakeholders) as 
these stakeholders have a greater probability and power in ensuring the ‘survival’ and the 
‘sustainability’ of companies’ operations. To best obtain insights about this possible 
phenomenon and argument, managerial stakeholder theory is adopted in this study. 
Accordingly, several independent variables are hypothesized under the umbrella of this 
theory, as outlined in the following hypotheses development. 
 
Board size 
In Indonesia, boards of commissioners6 function as the highest internal control 
mechanism within companies’ corporate governance structure (Bezemer et al., 2014). 
Commissioners functions as a check balance mechanism to ensure that companies act in 
the best interest of shareholders and they are responsible for supervising executive 
directors (Tricker, 1984; Millet-Reyes and Zhao 2010; Bezemer et al., 2014). Due to 
these positions and authority, commissioners can be categorized as influential 
stakeholders of companies. Within the framework of managerial stakeholder theory, it 
can be argued that the relationship between commissioners and the companies must be 
well managed by ‘satisfying’ them through, for example, the provision of certain 
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information in companies annual reports such as human right information. In the context 
of human rights disclosures, a company potentially discloses more information when it 
has a greater number of members in the board of commissioners. This is because each 
member may be interested in different human rights issues and the company attempts to 
address all of those issues and then discloses them in its annual reports. In line with past 
disclosure studies (e.g. Rouf, 2011), this study predicts the following hypothesis: 
  
H1:  There is a positive association between board size and the extent of human 
rights disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Liquidity  
Liquidity reflects the ability of a company to pay its current liabilities (Daniel, 2013). 
Companies with a higher level of liquidity have more ability to pay its liabilities than 
companies with a lower level of liquidity do. Information about liquidity is very 
important for creditors and shareholders to best portray the prospects of companies, 
particularly about the amount of dividends that will be obtained by shareholders as well 
as the amount of interests that will be obtained by creditors. The figures of liquidity 
therefore reflect the power of two influential stakeholders namely shareholders and 
creditors. When a company has a high level of liquidity, it is arguable that this company 
potentially discloses more information in their annual reports, including information 
about human rights issues. This is because such a company has sufficiently financial 
ability to perform certain activities such as human rights – related CSR activities and 
discloses those activities. Under the umbrella of managerial stakeholder theory, the 
purpose of companies with a high level of liquidity to perform certain activities and 
communicate those activities via certain media is arguably to satisfy shareholders and 
creditors, as these stakeholder groups are very influential in determining the ‘survival’ of 
the companies. Consistent with prior disclosure studies (e.g. Daniel, 2013), the following 
hypothesis is predicted: 
H2:  There is a positive association between liquidity and the extent of human 




Profitability is a company’s ability to make profits (Parker, 1992). Proponents of 
stakeholder theory such as Purushothaman et al., (2000) argue that companies with a 
higher level of profitability have more financial support to voluntarily undertake certain 
CSR activities, including human rights – related CSR activities, and communicate these 
activities in annual reports. Profitability thus helps companies to undertake certain actions 
for satisfying identified influential stakeholders. From the perspective of managerial 
stakeholder theory, it can be argued that a company with a higher level of profitability 
potentially provides more human rights information in its annual report. Some prior 
studies such as Robers (1992) document the positively significant impact of profitability 
on CSR disclosure practices. As such, this study proposes the following hypothesis:  
H3:  There is a positive association between profitability and the extent of 
human rights disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Leverage 
The degree of leverage reflect a company’s dependence on a key stakeholder group 
namely creditors. Stakeholder analysis used in previous studies concludes that creditors 
are important stakeholders whose influences on companies could be managed (Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987; Barton et al., 1989). In Indonesia, this stakeholder group is also 
considered as very important and therefore companies must be transparent to creditors 
(Okuda and Take, 2005; Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). It is 
documented in the literature creditors assess companies’ CSR activities through CSR 
disclosures to maintain their confidence in those companies (Roberts, 1992; 
Purushothaman et al., 2000). Such an assessment potentially occurs in the context of 
human rights related CSR activities and human rights disclosures. Within the framework 
of managerial stakeholder theory, it is arguable that companies with a higher degree of 
leverage potentially disclose more human rights information in their annual reports. 
Consistent with past disclosure studies (Purushothaman et al., 2000; Alvarez, 2007), this 
study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H4:  There is a positive association between leverage and the extent of human 




This paper includes company size and industry type as control variables in the statistical 
analysis. This is because these two variables potentially influence the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables in disclosure studies and thus they 
should be controlled (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Kent and Zunker, 
2013). Bigger companies potentially disclose more information in their annual reports 
because they deal with a more variety of issues in their daily activities. Finance 
companies may disclose less information about social and environmental issues because 
their employees have lower accident risks during daily operations and such companies do 
not produce poisonous emissions.  
 
3. Research methodology 
A sample of 75 Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) listed companies is randomly selected 
from a population of 459 for the year ending 2012 (IDX 2014). Data for all of the 
variables are collected from the 75 companies’ annual reports. Although there is a 
growing number of Indonesian companies ‘publish’ stand-alone sustainability reports, 
disclosures in such reports are not analyzed in this study. This is because, at present, there 
no regulations in Indonesia requiring companies to produce stand-alone sustainability 
reports. The number of companies voluntarily publishing stand-alone reports in this 
nation itself is still small. As stated by Kusumaputra (2012), there are only 40 Indonesian 
companies ‘producing’ stand-alone sustainability reports in 2012. The use of annual 
reports, which is an official reporting media that must be produced by Indonesian listed 
companies, as the source of the disclosure data in this study is therefore considered 
appropriate (see Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014).  
 
The dependent variable in this study, which is human rights disclosures, is measured by 
an unweighted disclosure index. Each disclosure item is therefore deemed equally 
important (see Meek et al., 1995). A score of 1 (one) is awarded to a sample company 
when a human right disclosure item is disclosed whereas a score of 0 (zero) is awarded 
when a human rights disclosure item is disclosed. The final disclosure index for each 
sample company is calculated by dividing the total score awarded to the sample company 
with the maximum number of items in the disclosure index checklist. 
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Nine Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) human rights disclosure items are adopted as the 
disclosure index checklist7. GRI guidelines are arguably the most widely accepted 
sustainability guidelines (Albareda, 2013; Epstein and Buhovac, 2014). GRI guidelines 
themselves are developed and continuously updated through interviews and dialogues 
with stakeholders around the globe (Global Reporting Initiative, 2014). Prior social and 
environmental reporting studies in Indonesia have also employed GRI guidelines (e.g. 
Trisnawati, 2012; Cahaya et al., 2012). Important human rights aspects resulted from 
conventions or declarations from international bodies such as the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization (ILO) 1998 
Declaration are also considered and included in GRI human rights indicators, 
highlighting the comprehensiveness of these guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 
2014). The use of GRI human rights indicators as the disclosure index checklist in this 
study is thus considered appropriate. 
 
The measurement techniques for measuring the independent and control variables are 
adopted from past studies (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Bokpin 
and Isshaq, 2009; Rouf, 2011; Cahaya et al., 2012; Daniel, 2013; Kent and Zunker, 
2013). These measurement techniques are displayed in Table I. 
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
4. Statistical results 
Results of the descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table II. 
It can be seen from the table that board size ranges from 2 to 10 members in the board of 
commissioners, with a mean of 5 members. There are no specific regulations requiring 
companies in Indonesia to have a certain number of commissioners in the board. 
According to Indonesian National Committee of Governance Policy, the number of the 
commissioners depends on the complexity of a company’s business and therefore it is 
actually up to the company to determine the appropriate number of commissioners in its 
board (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). 
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[Take in Table II] 
 
The level of liquidity ranges widely from 20.28% to 934.46%, with a mean of 
approximately 202%. Return on assets (ROA) also ranges widely from -12.75% to 
54.36% with an average mean of about almost 10%.  The figures of ROA highlights that 
there is an improvement in the economic performance of Indonesian companies during 
the last decade. As documented in the literature, the average ROA of Indonesian 
companies has increased from 2% in 2003 to nearly 4% in 2007 (see Nurhayati et al., 
2006; Cahaya et al., 2012). Such a phenomenon highlights the strength of the Indonesian 
private sector.  
 
As depicted in Table II, the figure of leverage, which ranges from about 4% to around 
328% with the mean of almost 52%, shows Indonesian companies’ dependence on 
creditors’ contributions. Total assets ranges widely from 3,077 million Rupiah to 
111,369,000 million Rupiah with an average of 7,594,859.46 million Rupiah8. 68% of 
sample companies are classified as high profile whereas 32% of sample companies are 
categorized as low profile. It can therefore be said that most Indonesian companies 
operate in a ‘sensitive’ industry with a possibly greater social impacts on stakeholders. 
 
The descriptive results of the dependent variable are presented in Table III. The 
descriptive results show that all of the 75 sample companies voluntarily disclose 
information regarding human rights in their annual reports. The level of human rights 
disclosures ranges from 11% (item out of nine disclosure items) to 100 % (all of the nine 
disclosure items). The mean is 36.74%, showing that, on average, IDX listed companies 
voluntarily communicate about three human rights disclosure items (out of 9 items) in 
their annual reports. This finding suggests that the human rights disclosure practices of 
Indonesia listed companies are low.   
 
[Take in Table III] 
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Figure I displays the variation of disclosure levels across the 9 voluntary human rights 
disclosure items by the 75 sample companies. It can be seen from this figure that 
Assessment is the most disclosed item (68 companies, 90.67%). This result indicates that 
most companies in Indonesia do report number of operations that have been subject to 
human rights reviews and/or impact assessments. It seems that companies in this 
developing nation have serious efforts to identify and to assess the possible impacts of 
their operations on human rights. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
companies in Indonesia attempt to respond to the United Nation Guiding Principles 
(UNGPs) which requires corporations worldwide to respect human rights in their daily 
operations. As reported by The President Post (2014), these principles have been widely 
accepted in South-east Asia and therefore companies within this region are urged to 
follow UNGPs by respecting and protecting human rights during their operations as well 
as remedying any violation of human rights for achieving sustainability (The President 
Post, 2014). 
 
[Take in Figure I] 
 
The second most disclosed item is Investment and procurement practices at 70.67%. This 
suggests that almost 71% sample companies do have significant investment agreements 
and contracts incorporating human rights concerns, do have suppliers, contractors, and 
other business partners that have undergone human rights screening, or do have employee 
training on policies and procedures concerning aspects of human rights (see Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2011). The disclosure of Investment and procurement issues 
indicates that companies in Indonesia attempt to implement the UNGPs for ‘remedying’ 
human rights violation they have done. According to Handayani (2014), while companies 
have an important role in the development and the growth of the Indonesian economy, 
there are actually a lot of human-rights violations done by companies in this emerging 
country such as annexations of indigenous people’s land in Papua. These violations 
potentially threaten companies’ sustainability. By having investment agreements 
concerning human rights issues, having business partners that have undergone human 
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rights screening, or having employee training in relation to human rights, and by 
communicating all of these activities in annual reports, companies might believe that their 
operations will be sustainable. 
 
The third most disclosed item is Security practices at 66.67 %. As with the disclosure of 
Investment and procurement practices, it appears that almost 67% companies in 
Indonesia provide training programs which include human rights aspects to their security 
personnel and communicate these programs in the annual reports. It is arguably important 
to have such a training to make sure that security personnel can behave professionally 
while working, by respecting human rights. If there are breaches of laws, rules, and 
regulations within companies, demonstrations done by employees or the local 
communities, or thieves caught, for instance, the security personnel is expected to deal 
with this problem professionally without violence. In practice, such a conduct or 
professionalism may be difficult to be implemented. Thus, this security practice is 
incorporated in the security personnel training programs in companies (see Sudahnan, 
2011; Dirjen PAUDNI, 2014).  
 
Interestingly, Figure I shows that Child labour and Forced and compulsory labour are the 
least disclosed items at 4%. A possible explanation for the small percentage of IDX listed 
companies communicating these issues is that they do not employ children and there are 
no forced and compulsory labours in their daily operations. As listed companies are 
companies which must meet a certain standard required by the capital market, it is logical 
to assume that such companies tend to be more professional than companies which are 
not listed on a capital market. Accordingly, they do have professional recruitment 
systems recruiting working-aged employees with a certain skill. Such recruitment 
systems are important not only to follow the government’s regulation in relation to child 
labour employment but also for their own future performance. As most of the sample 
companies do not have child labours and forced and compulsory labours, they may think 
that it is not necessary to provide information about these issues in their annual reports. 
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One could argue that IDX listed companies actually have child labours and/or forced and 
compulsory labours. This is because data from the Indonesian Directorate General of 
Training and Productivity shows that there are about 300,000 children working across 
industries in Indonesia (see again Section 1 of this paper). This argument might have 
some merit. If this child labour employment really presents, IDX listed companies must 
have hidden this information from the eyes of their stakeholders and therefore most of 
those companies do not disclose this fact. However, this might not be totally true. The 
three hundred thousand child labours do present but they might work in informal 
employments or are employed by unlisted companies. Data from the US Department of 
State shows that child labours and forced and compulsory labours are employed in 
domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation, and domestic service (US 
Department of State, 2014). Further investigation by undertaking qualitative research, 
however, is needed to prove the truth of this ‘speculation’.  
 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested by using multiple regression. Classical assumptions of 
multiple regression9, consisting of normality, multicollinearity, outliers, and 
homoscedasticity (see Hair et al., 1998; Coakes and Steed, 2007), have been checked  
and it was found that the homoscedasticity assumption was not initially met. Data of all 
continuous variables were then transformed into natural logarithm. Heteroscedasticity, 
however, still existed after the transformation. This study finally decides to use the initial 
regression results because, according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), heteroscedasticity 
does not invalidate the multiple regression results although the results may become weak. 
They further argue that the ‘violation’ of homoscedasticity assumption in the multiple 
regression analysis is not fatal and as long as the main regression assumption is met, 
which the normality assumption, the association between variables can be regarded 
homoscedastic. As the normality assumption is met in the initial regression analysis, the 
decision to use the initial multiple regression results for testing the hypotheses is 
considered appropriate. The results of the initial multiple regression analysis are 
presented in Table IV. 
 
[Take in Table IV] 
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As reported in Table IV, the regression model is significant (p-value 0.011). The value of 
adjusted R-square is 0.141, meaning that the variability of human rights disclosure 
practices can be explained by the predictor variables in the model as much as about 14%. 
Specifically, the variation of voluntary human rights disclosure practices is explained by 
the variation of board size and company size as their p-values are significant at 5% level 
and 10% level respectively. The coefficient of board size is positive, showing that 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted. This finding suggests that companies with a greater number of 
members in the board of commissioners disclose more human rights information in their 
annual reports. The significance of one control variable namely company size at 10% 
moderate significance level and the positive coefficient of this control variable indicates 
that bigger companies voluntarily provide more human rights information in their annual 
reports. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In summary, there is a low level of human rights disclosure practices (36.74 %) by IDX 
listed companies with at least one item is communicated. Most companies probably do 
not have child labours and forced and compulsory labours and thus only 4% of sample 
companies communicate child labour and forced and compulsory labour issues. However, 
given that there is a small number of companies disclose those human rights issues in the 
annual reports, there is also a possibility that some companies attempt to hide particular 
information in relation to child labour and forced and compulsory labour. This is because 
these issues are sensitive or some of the sample companies may actually implement child 
labour and forced and compulsory labour employments.  
 
The explanation regarding the small number of companies disclosing child labour issues 
above is arguable given that there are two possibilities than need further investigations, 
whether companies do not disclose child labour information because they do not employ 
child workers or because they actually employ child workers but then they attempt to 
hide this fact. It is clear from the Manpower Act No. 13/2003 that companies are strictly 
prohibited to employ children under 13 years old regardless of the hours worked, to 
employ children ages 13-14 for more than 15 hours per week, and to employ children 
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ages 15-17 for more than 40 hours per week (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2003; US 
Department of State, 2014). The penalty for violating this regulation is two to five years 
of imprisonment and a fine of 200 million Rupiah to 500 million Rupiah (US Department 
of State, 2014).  
 
Listed companies might not have child workers as their operations are strictly regulated 
and monitored by the Indonesian Financial Service Authority (OJK) and they must meet 
certain criteria or standard to be listed on a capital market. However, given that there are 
child labour cases in developing countries such as Bangladesh (see Belal, 2008; Islam 
and Deegan, 2010), there is also a possibility that some IDX listed companies still 
employ child workers. According to the US Department of State, children in Indonesia 
are still employed in the following employment: prostitution, mining, pearl diving, 
construction, scavenging, offshore fishing, cottage industry, production of explosives,  
domestic service, working on the street, plantations, forestry, and industries that use 
hazardous chemicals (US Department of State, 2014). Some IDX listed companies 
categorized in those industries might also be involved child employment. Such a situation 
may also apply to forced and compulsory labour in this emerging country. To know the 
truth, further investigations are definitely needed. 
 
An important finding of this study was that board size was a positively significant 
predictor of voluntary human rights disclosure practices. This is consistent with the result 
of an empirical study of voluntary disclosure practices in Bangladesh undertaken by Rouf 
(2011) and supports Hypothesis 2. Companies with a bigger number of commissioners in 
the board disclose more information about human rights issues in their annual reports. 
One explanation for this positively significant association is that commissioners are 
interested in human rights issues and therefore, within the context of managerial 
stakeholder theory, companies attempt to satisfy them by undertaking good human-rights 
CSR activities and disclose these activities in the annual reports. Commissioners 
themselves may have a strong commitment in making sure that corporations they 
supervise do respect and protect human rights as well as do remedy any violation of 
human rights. The implication of this finding is that commissioners in Indonesia have the 
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UNGPs spirit. Companies can see this spirit and then respond to what they see by 
reporting human rights information. The other implication is that, to some extent, there is 
an effective corporate governance association and mechanism between commissioners 
and the management, particularly in the context of companies’ transparency in human 
rights issues.  
 
Liquidity was found to be insignificant. This finding is consistent with Belkaou-Riahi et 
al., (1978) and Baroko, et al., (2006). This insignificant statistical result is possibly 
explained by the argument that shareholders and creditors might be more interested in 
financial information about companies than human rights issues (see Cahaya et al., 2012) 
and therefore companies do not provide human rights information for them.  This is 
because shareholders usually need to see the financial performance as well as the 
dividends they will obtain. Creditors might also be more interested in financial 
information as it describes companies’ financial ability to pay their debts. This argument 
might also explain the insignificance result of leverage.    
 
This study found that profitability does not significantly influence the level of human 
rights disclosures. This result is consistent with Hamid (2004) and Kent and Zunker, 
(2013). A possible explanation for this insignificant result is that companies having 
satisfactory financial performance do not use their excess money to perform human rights 
– related CSR activities. Instead, they use the money for enhancing and expanding their 
businesses for the preparation a more tight competition nationally and internationally (see 
Indonesia-Investments, 2014). The business enhancement and expansion are possibly 
done by strengthening their information technology (IT) and information system (IS) 
infrastructures, opening new branches in Indonesia or overseas, recruiting new 
experienced manager, etc. In particular, it appears that Indonesian companies use their 
excess money to increase their competitiveness for dealing with a more tight competition 
in the ASEAN economic community10.   
 
One control variable, which is company size, was found to be positively significant at a 
moderate statistical level. This positively significant result is consistent with many 
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studies showing that bigger companies disclose more information on CSR issues (e.g. 
Gao et al., 2005; Kent and Zunker, 2013). One possible reason is that larger companies 
potentially face a more variety of problems in their daily activities as their business 
scopes and structures are usually more complex. As such, bigger companies do have a 
more variety of issues to be addressed and disclosed. 
 
The other control variable, which is industry type, was found to be insignificant. 
Companies in different industries (high and low profiles) may have different CSR 
disclosure levels but the differences do not exist in specific human rights disclosures. 
Instead, the differences potentially exist in another CSR disclosure which is arguably 
more sensitive, which is occupational health and safety disclosures. This is indicated by 
the extremely high number of work accidents in Indonesia. In 2011, for instance, there 
were 99,491 reported accidents during works (see Chevny, 2012). Arguably, most of the 
victims of these accidents are high profile industry workers as more that 60% of 
Indonesian workers are employed within high profile industries (see BPS, 2010). 
Therefore, high profile companies may think that it is much better to address the most 
urgent CSR issues which are relevant to their industry such as occupational health and 
safety issues and then they might consider addressing and communicating other CSR 
issues such as human right issues.  
 
Overall, Indonesian listed companies voluntarily provide a low level of human rights 
disclosures. It is found that the variability of human rights disclosures is partially 
explained by managerial stakeholder theory. The low level of human rights disclosures in 
this developing nation implies that most key stakeholders do not see the importance or 
the urgency of human rights issues to be disclosed and therefore companies do not 
attempt to provide information about these issues. It is also implied from the findings that 
commissioners are the only key stakeholders who expect human rights disclosures from 
Indonesian companies. 
 
The low level of human rights disclosures may also be explained by the argument that 
companies do not have child workers and forced and compulsory workers but there is 
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also a possibility that companies attempt to hide information regarding these sensitive 
issues from the eyes of stakeholders. The possible motivation of hiding these issues is 
that some Indonesian listed companies actually employ children or have forced and 
compulsory workers and this possibility should be proved by further qualitative 
investigations. This study provides important contributions to the literature by offering 
additional knowledge regarding the positively significant impact of board size on the 
level of human rights disclosure practices in Indonesia and the positively significant 
influence of one control variable namely company size on the level of those disclosure 
practices.  
 
Since board size is proven to be the predictor of human rights disclosures, there is a 
potency to increase the awareness of the business community on human rights issues in 
Indonesia by utilizing the strategic position and power of commissioners to campaign and 
promote the importance of human rights related CSR. According to Lukviarman (2016), 
it is expected that commissioners can help directors formulate companies’ strategies. This 
is because they have various backgrounds and experiences.  Thus, to minimize the 
potential presence of corporate human rights abuses, it is necessary for either national or 
international human rights organizations (e.g. the National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM), Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights First) to actively approach 
commissioners in Indonesia and prepare a clear corporate sustainability agenda in relation 
to human rights issues.  
 
As with all research, this study has limitations. Firstly, this study focuses on a 
quantitative analysis. The findings, however, needs to be further investigated by 
undertaking qualitative research so that an in-depth understanding about whether or not 
companies actually have child workers and forced and compulsory workers can be 
obtained. Secondly, this study focuses only on disclosures in annual reports. This is 
because an annual report is an official communication medium that must be provided by 
listed companies in Indonesia (BAPEPAM-LK, 2006) and is the main company’s 
communication vehicle (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Barako and Brown, 2008). Future 
human rights - related CSR disclosure studies should therefore undertake further 
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investigations through a qualitative examination on the possible reason for the low level 
of human rights disclosures, particularly on whether or not companies have child workers 
and forced and compulsory workers. Future studies should also examine disclosures in 
other communication mediums such as stand-alone sustainability reports if there are a 
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THE 2011 GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (GRI)  
  HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS 
No. Aspect 
1 Investment and procurement practices 
2 Non-discrimination 
3 Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
4 Child labour 
5 Forced and compulsory labour 
6 Security practices 
7 Indigenous rights 
8 Assessment 
9 Remediation 


















 The number of members in the board of 
commissioners Continuous 
Liquidity  Current assets divided by current liabilities Continuous 
Profitability 
 Return on Assets (ROA) : 2 year average 
Continuous 
Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total assets Continuous 
 
Company 




1 = high profile  
0 = low profile industry 
Categorical 
Source: Original table 
*) Consistent with previous disclosure studies in Indonesia (Nurhayati, 2005; Cahaya et al., 2012), this study 
classifies seven IDX industry categories, which are Agriculture, Mining, Basic Industry and Chemicals, 
Miscellaneous Industry, Consumer Goods Industry, Property and Real Estate, and Infrastructure Utilities and 
Transportation, into high profile industries. This because, in these categories, companies’ operations potentially 
have greater social and environmental impacts on their stakeholders and the natural environment. In contrast, 
two other IDX industries categories, which are Finance and Trade, Service, and Investment, are classified as low 
profile industries as the operations of companies in these categories arguably have smaller social and 
environmental impacts.   
 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics of the Independent and Control Variables 
Panel A: Continuous Variables    
Variable  Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Board size (number of members 
in the board) 
 2 10 5 1.8 
Liquidity ( %)  20.28 934.46 202.04 1.65 
Profitability (ROA in %)  -12.75 54.36 9.97 12.34 
Leverage (in %)  3.97 327.77 51.57 47.7 
Company size (million Rupiah)  3,077 111,369,000 7,594,859.46 15,836,180.33 
Panel B: Categorical Variable    
Variable    Percentage 
Industry type     
High profile industry    68 
Low profile industry    32 
Source: Original table     
 
 
  Table III: Descriptive Statistics of Human Rights Disclosure Practices 







Deviation     
(%)  
 29 
Human rights disclosure 
index (%) of 75 sample 
companies 
11 100 36.74 21.06 
Source: Original table 
 






(Constant)             0.126 0.126 
Board size +            0.296     0.039** 
Liquidity +            0.011 0.488 
Profitability +            0.298 0.125 
Leverage +            0.009 0.855 
Company size (control variable) +            0.00000000289   0.062* 
Industry type (control variable) +            0.038 0.465 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R-Square  0.141 
Standard Error of the Estimate      0.19523 
Regression Model (Sig.)       0.011** 
**significant at 5 % level; *significant at 10% percent level 





















Figure I: The 9 Items of Voluntary Human Rights Disclosures 
 




1 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, 
trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region and currently has 21 member states such as Japan, Malaysia and 
New Zealand (Human Resources Development Working Group, 2014). The latest APEC Summit was held from 
8 to 9 November 2014 in Beijing, China (Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia, 2014). 
2 Directorate General of Training and Productivity is a directorate general under the Ministry of Employment, 
the Republic of Indonesia (Kementrian Ketenagakerjaan Republik Indonesia, 2014). 
3 Under Act No. 13/2013, companies in Indonesia are not allowed to employ children under 13 years old 
(Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2013). 
4 At present, Indonesia is in the process of convergence with the international accounting standards (IAIGlobal, 
2016).  
5 As stated by Epstein and Buhovac (2014), corporations need financial resources to undertake various 
sustainability activities, including human rights protection programs, and disclose those activities in a certain 
medium such an annual report. Each corporation’s financial resources themselves are always limited. To be 
efficient in the use of financial resources, only stakeholders which are considered influential are managed and 
satisfied by companies. Arguably, it is impossible to satisfy all stakeholders due to the limited amount of 
corporations’ financial resources. 
6 In Indonesia, companies apply a two tier management structure in which commissioners can be regarded as 
equivalent to directors in a one tier management structure (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2007). 
Commissioners in a two tier structure and directors in a one tier structure has the same responsibility as the 
supervisors and the advisors of the management (Bezemer et al., 2014). 
7 The details of the nine GRI human rights items used as the disclosure index checklist in this study are 
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(see Global Reporting Initiative, 2011). This is because the version which is relevant to the 2012 data is the 
2011 version. 
8 For illustrative purposes, 7,594,859.46 million Rupiah equals to about 605 million US Dollars. This currency 
conversion is calculated based on the recent value of Rupiah (December 20, 2014) against the US Dollar (see 
Bank Mandiri, 2014). 
9 For brevity, the results of the assumption tests are not shown in this paper.   
10 The ASEAN Economic Community is the goal of regional economic integration resulted from the joint 
commitment by leaders of ASEAN members in the 12th ASEAN Summit and should be established by 2015 
(ASEAN, 2008). In such a community, ASEAN will become a region with free movement of skilled labours, 
goods and services, investment, and freer flow of capital (ASEAN, 2013). 
